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Convergence or Divergence Patterns in Global Defence Spending: Further Evidence from a 
Nonlinear Single Factor Model
Abstract
This study re-examines the international convergence in defence spending for 125 countries 
spanning 1985-2018. We employ the approach of Phillips and Sul, which tests for the existence of 
convergence clubs and the modelling of different transition paths to convergence. Our findings 
suggest no overall defence spending convergence at the world, income groups (except the low-
income countries) and regional levels. However, we identify two convergence clubs using an 
iterative testing procedure and eventually (i) at world level, these two clubs exhibit convergence, 
and (ii) while taking into account Gross national income, geography and defence 
alliances/economic cooperation it is possible to make different number of convergence/divergence 
clubs. Contrary to previous findings, this study finds that the process of convergence in defence 
spending does not reflect the desirable emanations of defence policies sharing similar 
characteristics, at least in terms of the allocation of scarce public resources across the globe.
Keywords: Defence spending, convergence club, Log t regression test, Club merging
JEL classification: H560, O50
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This study focuses on international convergence in defence spending (hereafter, DS)1. 
International convergence in DS simply implies that countries across the globe are moving towards 
allocating the same/ similar levels of scarce public resources to the defence sector. How true this 
convergence is in DS remains a question that deserves an answer through empirical investigation. 
This is because many countries have different reasons for demanding DS. As highlighted in the 
literature, the demand for DS could be based on different factors according to the organisational 
politics models,2  arms race models3 and the neoclassical models4. As governments of countries 
demand and allocate resources to the defence sector, annual reports by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) continue to give an estimated figure of the amount allocated to 
the defence sector globally. For example, the SIPRI reports of 2018, 2017, 2016 and 2014 show 
that global DS stood at $1822 billion, $1739 billion, $1686 billion and $1776 billion respectively. 
The 2016 estimate is a marginal increase of about 0.4 per cent in real terms on 2015.
This study focuses on the international convergence of DS because: (i) inferences from testing the 
convergence of DS at the global level can determine whether a target set for the defence series, 
especially DS, will be realised given the guns and butter associated with DS; (ii) it enables us to 
know whether idiosyncratic country-specific factors could be the reason behind the differences in 
DS across the globe. Recently published studies that have investigated whether there is DS 
convergence at the international level include those of Arvanitidis, Kollias and Anastasopoulos 
(2014), Arvanitidis and Kollias (2016); Lau, Demir and Bilgin (2016); Clements, Gupta and 
Khamidova (2019). The conclusions of these studies are similar because they allude to the fact that 
a slow process of international DS convergence exists. The methodological approaches adopted 
by these studies are mainly the conventional unit root test, σ- and β-convergence methods. 
However, these methods have been found incapable of dealing with problems such as 
heterogeneity or unique transition patterns across different countries, sectors, states or regions. In 
order to overcome these estimation problems, we applied the club convergence test developed by 
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) to 125 countries between 1985 and 2018, to investigate international 
convergence in defence spending. Therefore, this study attempts to fill the gap in the existing 
literature by using the methodological approach developed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009), which 
helped to overcome the econometric problems associated with previous studies in testing for 
international convergence in defence burdens. 
This study utilised the methodological approach proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) 
because of the following advantages it has over other methodological approaches. First, it did not 
1 Please note that the keywords for defence spending (DS) include defence expenditure (DE), military expenditure (ME), military 
spending (MS), and defence burden (DB).
2 The simplest organisational type model is proposed by Lucier (1979). In Lucier’s model, future defence budget decisions are 
based on small revisions of past spending levels. 
3 This type of model is based on the Richardson type arms race models where the level of rival countries' DS is the major 
determinant of one country DS. The decision of DS is characterised by an action-reaction process.
4 Neoclassical models of the demand for DS focus on the military, economic and political determinants of DS. The formal models, 
which are developed from the neoclassical approach, consider the country or state as maximising a social welfare function.
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start with specific assumptions that the stationarity of the variables and/or the presence of common 
factors are necessary. Second, it is based on a general form of nonlinear time-varying factor 
models. Third, it assimilates the possibilities of transition heterogeneity or transition divergence. 
Fourth, it helps to identify the existence of club convergence or clusters in which different 
convergence paths can be distinguished among heterogeneous economies involved in a 
convergence process. A further contribution of the study is that it uses the SIPRI dataset that covers 
both the cold war and post-cold war periods on DS as a share of GDP (Perlo-Freeman & Sköns, 
2016; Perlo-Freeman, 2017). This is because it allows scholars in the field of defence and peace 
economics to obtain more reliable, consistent and robust empirical results, inferences and 
conclusions over a long period of time, as recent studies addressing various aspects of DS have 
done (inter alia: Malizard, 2016; Kollias et al., 2017; d’Agostino et al., 2017).
We disaggregated our data by considering country-specific or region-specific characteristics, such 
as defence alliances and rivalries, political and economic development/cooperation factors. In 
order to allow for a country’s  possible differences in the economic impact brought to bear by DS 
that rely on the structure of its productive base and development level, we divided the sample into 
four income groups using the World Bank classification (Desli et al. 2017, Huang et al. 2017). We 
therefore grouped the countries into four income groups (this includes low, lower-middle, upper-
middle, and high-income countries), six regional groups (this includes Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean, Europe & Central Asia, Asia, and 
Europe), and three defence alliances/economic cooperation groups (these include the G7, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) countries). 
The empirical findings herein suggest no overall DS convergence at the world, income group, and 
regional levels. However, we identified convergence clubs using an iterative testing procedure. 
The key findings from the club convergence algorithm results suggest that: (i) at world level, club 
1 and 2 converge; (ii) the remaining groups form 1, 2, 3 and 4 clubs with different outcomes (that 
is, convergence/divergence). Contrary to previous findings, this study found that the process of 
convergence in DS does not reflect the desirable emanations of defence policies sharing similar 
characteristics, at least in terms of the allocation of scarce public resources across the globe.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of global defence 
spending as a share of GDP with the aid of a graphical presentation. Section 3 reviews the empirical 
literature. Section 4 presents the Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) methodology alongside with the 
data source. Section 5 presents the empirical results and discussion. While Section 6 concludes the 
study.
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2 A brief overview of global defence spending
This section provides a visual inspection of the average DS as a percentage share of GDP according 
to the international, income, regional, economic and defence alliance groupings. The 125 countries 
were classified into four income groups based on the World Bank classification of the world's 
economies into low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries5. Countries were 
grouped into six regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East & North Africa, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Europe & Central Asia, Asia, and Europe 6. We further classified the countries 
based on their economic and defence alliances: the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)7. A 
visual inspection of Figure 1A shows that the world average DS as a share of GDP experienced 
higher DS during the Cold War period, and was lower in the post-bipolar era, although the picture 
is a little different when it comes to the absolute value of DS globally8. After the world’s average 
spending trend, the rest of the trends followed the order of high-income, upper-middle, lower-
middle, and low-income countries. A visual inspection of Figure 1B shows that after the world’s 
average spending trend, Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, Europe & Central Asia, Europe, & 
the Middle East, and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan Africa then follow in that order. 
These regions experienced a higher average DS as a share GDP during the Cold War period, and 
a sharp decline in the post-bipolar era. A similar inference holds for Figure 1C.
<Insert Figure 1>
3 Literature Review
The study on convergence began to gain prominence among scholars after the classical works of 
Solow (1956, 1957) and Swan (1956). Ever since then, the critical question that several papers 
have tried to address is whether or not there is a long-run tendency towards catching-up. This is a 
question that has taken different dimensions and yet imbedded in the heart of every convergence 
discourse. After Solow’s (1956, 1957) and Swan’s (1956) classical works, the concept of 
convergence was later further expanded by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992). This was 
because they were the first set of scholars to introduce the concept of β and σ-convergence. The 
concept of β and σ-convergence have been used by several studies to investigate whether poor 
countries/regions grow faster than the richer one, suggesting that the they will catch up (β-
convergence) in the long-run, or whether the dispersion of the income diminishes (σ-convergence) 
over time. The stochastic convergence and club convergence are other concepts in the empirical 
literature that have been widely applied in studies. Stochastic convergence basically uses the 
method of time-series analysis to examine whether permanent shocks to an economy are persisting 
over time. Studies that have used this methodology include DeJuan and Tomljanovich (2005), 
Genc et al. (2011), Solarin (2019) among others. While club convergence implies that a set of 
5 For details, see the data section. The reason for this classification is provided in the introduction section of this study.
6 For details, see the data section.
7 For details, see the data section.
8 For a detailed discussion see Sandler and George (2016).
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economies, countries, states and regions with similar conditions and structural characteristics (such 
as technology, preferences, political systems etc.) will tend to converge to the same steady state, 
or economies with similar characteristics move from a disequilibrium position to their club-
specific steady state positions. 
Quah (1993), Carlino and Mills (1993), Bernard and Durlauf (1995), and Evans (1998) critique 
the econometric validity of using cross-section base approaches to test β and σ-convergence and 
then recommended the use of time series methods given that the cross-section approach may tend 
to be subject to biasness (Quah, 1993). Islam (2003) also argues that β-convergence can be seen 
as a necessary but not sufficient condition for σ-convergence - but is useful since it allows for a 
more appropriate interpretation of results in terms of growth model frameworks. Islam (2003) 
identify some challenges associated with the issues of empirical convergence testing, namely: 
theoretical perspective; noncomparability of different null hypothesis testing; and the use of time 
series approaches which depend on different and to some extent very specific assumptions9. It was 
on these bases that Phillips and Sul (2007) proposed a different approach for the discussion of the 
convergence issues.  Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) methodology is based on the structure of ‘non-
linear, time-varying coefficients factor model’10. Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) argues that 
convergence may be an ongoing process because some countries may be catching-up without 
having reached the steady state. In such cases, a rejection of convergence would not be fair. And 
that was why they proposed the concept of relative/club convergence, which considers the 
transition path of each country together with its growth performance to find convergence. Since 
the inception of the seminal work on convergence of Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Barro (1991) 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), many studies in the field of macroeconomic theory have 
explored the concept, with studies also focusing on different variables such as environmental 
convergence, tourism, energy consumption, real/income GDP per capita, fiscal and monetary 
policies, security outcomes, public expenditure, trade etc. (inter alia: Bajona & Kehoe, 2010; 
Apergis et al., 2013; Mishra & Smyth, 2014; Solarin & Lean, 2014; Su et al., 2014; Ulucaka & 
Apergis, 2017; Von Lyncker & Thoennessen 2017; Saba & Ngepah, 2019a).
Before scholars began to examine the convergence in defence spending, large body of literature 
have investigated the nexus between defence spending and other economic indicators/variables 
such as: industrialisation; economic growth; investment; debt burden; poverty and inequality; 
unemployment etc. (Inter alia: Henderson, 1998; Ahmed, 2012; Ali, 2012; Malizard, 2014; Saba 
& Ngepah, 2019c, 2019d; Kollias & Paleologou, 2019). For example, Churchill and Yew (2018) 
conducts a meta-analysis of the empirical literature that examines the impact of military 
expenditure on economic growth. They use a sample of 272 meta-observations drawn from 48 
primary studies and conclude with the growth-retarding effects of military expenditure. Although 
the results from the meta-regression analysis suggest that the effect size estimate is strongly 
9 To apply the tests, someone has to consider, e.g. stationarity properties. Quite often, the tests assume very specific characteristics of the underlying 
panel structures.
10 It uses clustering procedure with asymptotic properties of convergence and regression- based test. It does not depend on stationarity assumptions 
and it covers possible transition paths towards convergence (including subgroup convergence).
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influenced by study variations that has to do with: underlying theoretical models; econometric 
specifications; data type; and data period. These are some of the relevant factors that explain the 
heterogeneity in the defence spending-growth literature. The results of the study further show that 
the growth-retarding effects of defence expenditure is more pronounced in developing countries 
than in developed countries. The debate on the nexus between defence spending and growth has 
remained a continuous one without an emerging consensus since the first seminal work of Benoit 
(1973, 1978). 
In a similar manner, studies on convergence in defence spending is gradually gaining more 
attention among scholars with different methodologies adopted and conclusions reached. For 
example, Arvanitidis et al. (2014) investigates the international convergence in defence burdens 
which was an initial finding with a sample of 128 countries covering the period 1988-2008. They 
use σ-convergence and β-convergence methodologies to achieve their objective. The initial 
findings of the study suggest a process of convergence in defence burdens which conceivably 
reflects the emergence of defence policies that share similar characteristics at least in terms of the 
allocation of resources. Arvanitidis and Kollias (2016) builds on the previous study of Arvanitidis 
et al. (2014) by readdressing the international convergence in defence burdens with a new dataset 
of SIPRI which spans from 1970-2015. They employ similar methodologies used in the first study 
to achieve their objective. The results of the study accord with the earlier findings of Arvanitidis 
et al.’s (2014) study. Lau et al. (2016) investigates a nonlinear model of military expenditure 
convergence by using Estar nonlinear unit root test. They test the nonlinear catching up hypothesis 
for 37 countries between 1988 and 2012. Results from individual nonlinear cross-sectionally 
augmented Dickey–Fuller (NCADF) regression indicate that 53% of countries converge to world’s 
average military expenditure: where 39% of countries converge to Germany; 33% of countries 
converge to China; 22% of countries converge to the USA, and 11% of countries converge to 
Russia. Interestingly, USA does not exhibit nonlinear military expenditure convergence toward 
world’s average level. For panel NCADF regression, the result suggests that on average, there is 
evidence for countries converging to USA’s military expenditure at 10% significance level. For 
the convergence to the world’s average, the statistical significance is at the 1% significance level.
Some empirical studies in the literature have focused on NATO countries, for example, Sawhney 
et al. (2016) examines convergence in military spending among NATO countries between 1988 
and 2012. They employ sequential panel selection method (SPSM) to ascertain whether the 
military spending of 19 NATO countries has converged relative to that of the USA. The results 
from the SPSM indicate that military spending of NATO countries, with the exception of Hungary, 
have converged to the USA’s defence burden.  Liu, Su, Tao and Cong (2019) used the same 
methodological approach with that of Sawhney et al. (2016) to investigate the convergence 
properties of military burden in 20 NATO countries between 1990 and 2015. The UK and USA 
are used as benchmarks in the analysis. It is observed that about 80% of the military burden in 
NATO member countries are convergent with the military burden in UK and that no country’s 
military burden is convergent with the USA’s military burden. Arvanitidis et al. (2017) employs β 
and σ-convergence methodologies as well as Markov chains to examine the presence of a defence 
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policy convergence in the NATO alliance. Defence spending as a share of GDP is used as the 
variable through which the objective of the study was achieved. The results suggest the presence 
of a defence policy convergence process. While on the contrary, Güriş et al. (2017) utilises linear 
and nonlinear unit root tests to investigate the convergence hypothesis of military expenditure for 
NATO countries for the period 1953 to 2014. The findings of the study show that the military 
expenditures of Germany, Greece, Portugal, the UK and Luxembourg converges to the NATO’s 
mean while the rest of the member states diverges. Solarin (2019) examines the convergence of 
defence burdens in Asia-pacific economies by using a residual augmented least squares (RALS) 
unit root test. The study uses two different datasets for military expenditure which was sourced 
from both Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT). The data generated from the WMEAT database 
spans from 1974-2016, while that of SIPRI covers the period between 1974 and 2016 with 14 
selected countries. The findings of the study suggest a weak evidence for convergence of military 
expenditure in Asia-Pacific region. The result obtained from the study was a point of departure 
from some of the existing studies conducted by Sawhney et al. (2016), Güriş et al. (2017) 
Arvanitidis et al. (2017), Liu et al. (2018) etc. that have provided substantial evidence of 
convergence among NATO countries. Clements et al. (2019) examines the evolution of worldwide 
military spending. The country sample for the study consists of 140 economies: 34 advanced 
economies, and 106 developing economies (DE) and covers the period 1970-2017. The study 
employs σ-convergence and β-convergence methodologies. In understanding the factors that drive 
changes in military spending, they follow Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) in employing an 
error correction model that can separate both the short-term and long-term effects of different 
factors driving government spending. The study finds that military spending in relation to GDP is 
converging, but into three separate groups of countries. In the largest group, responsible for 90 
percent of worldwide spending, outlays have remained stubbornly high. The findings of the study 
further suggest that military spending in developing economies reacts to improvements in security 
conditions and military spending in neighboring countries, suggesting that further increases in the 
peace dividend are possible. In developing economies, rising social spending tends to crowd out 
military outlays, but this is not the case in advanced economies. 
Soler I Lecha (2010) explores the degree of convergence, divergence in Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries towards the European security and defence policy. The study focuses on 
two cases, Morocco and Turkey, but also referred to other Mediterranean partners. The study 
argues that policy convergence in the field of security and defence has reflected process-oriented 
goals rather than a substantive convergence of strategic interests. The study concludes by alluding 
to the fact that EU’s differentiated geographical approach in security and defence cooperation in 
the Mediterranean impacts on the broader region-building endeavour. Das, Dinda and Martin 
(2018) tries to study whether the selection of 45 countries (23 high-income or developed countries 
and 22 developing/middle- & low-income countries) chosen for their study are converging or 
diverging in terms of per capita military spending for the period 1988-2013. They utilise Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992) standard methodology of testing for convergence among nations. Their 
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study reveals that there are absolute β and σ convergence among the countries with Kuwait and 
South Africa as outlier countries. It also observes conditional β convergence among the countries 
with various resources, particularly, crude oil production, regional dummies and time trend as 
significant conditional variables. This shows that countries with natural endowment plays a 
significant role in the study. Focusing on another region, Saba and Ngepah’s (2019a) study 
investigates military expenditure and security outcome convergence for eight regional economic 
communities (RECs) of Africa between 1995 and 2015. They ultilise Phillips and Sul panel 
convergence methodology to each of the region’s military expenditure and security outcome. The 
results of their study suggest that the convergence club of military expenditure and security 
outcome cannot be generalised across the RECs of African countries, and likewise for the overall 
convergence of the regions. Specifically, the findings of the study show nonconvergence of the 
full sample and the presence of the different subgroup convergence clubs for both variables across 
the RECs of African countries.
The few empirical studies that have examined the convergence of DS suggest the following: firstly, 
none of the foregoing studies have used the methodological approach proposed by Phillips and Sul 
(2007, 2009) except the one conducted by Saba and Ngepah (2019a), which was myopic in scope 
because it mainly focuses on the African RECs; secondly, the cold war and post-cold war dataset 
of SIPRI has not been used to test the club convergence/divergence of international DS by applying 
the Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) methodology. Lastly, in the context of convergence, previous 
studies have not focused attention on countries when they are classified into income levels, 
regions, economic cooperation and defence alliance by applying the Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) 
methodology. Hence, the rationale for this study.
4 Methodology and Data 
In this section, we briefly explain and discuss the different steps involved in executing the 
clustering algorithm that allowed us to classify countries into different income levels, regions and 
subregions. This is with the aim of examining their panel and club convergence, and along side 
with the panel transition curves.
4.1 Log t convergence test: Phillips and Sul (2007) propose log  which is decomposed into 𝑋𝑖𝑡
two parts: the common factor, ,  and the idiosyncratic factor loading  that absorbs the error 𝜇𝑡 𝛿𝑖𝑡
terms . Both the common factor ( ) and idiosyncratic factor loading ( ) are time varying. The ɛ𝑖𝑡 𝜇𝑡 𝛿𝑖𝑡
 determines the common defence spending as share of GDP (DS) path according to the relation:𝜇𝑡
                            (1)𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑡
The above formulation enables us to test whether the factor loading  converges. To accomplish 𝛿𝑖𝑡
this, Phillips and Sul (2007) constructed the panel relative transition coefficient/parameter, , as:ℎ𝑖𝑡
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which helps in measuring the coefficient of factor loading  in respect of the panel average of the 𝛿𝑖𝑡
transition path for the economy i. The relative transition curves portray the relative transition 
coefficients , estimated from equation (2). Convergence implies that an individual unit ℎ𝑖𝑡
approaches the sample average over time. Therefore, the following holds:
(1) 𝛿𝑖𝑡→𝛿 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑎𝑠 𝑡→∞ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝛿𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 
                                                                                                                                                              (3)𝛿 𝑎𝑠 𝑡→∞ 
(2)   ℎ𝑖𝑡→1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑎𝑠 𝑡→∞ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
     (4)    𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑠 𝑡→∞ 




𝑖 = 1(ℎ𝑖𝑡 ― 1)
2 →0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑎𝑠 𝑡→∞ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 ― 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡 ,
    (5) 𝐻𝑡, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑎𝑠 𝑡→∞ 
From equations 3, 4 and 5, to account for possible nonstationary panel transition behaviour which 
may be caused by a decrease in the cross-sectional variance of a sample, even when there is no 
panel convergence and only local convergence within certain subgroups, Phillips and Sul (2007) 
propose the following semiparametric specification of :𝛿𝑖𝑡
                                                   (6)𝛿𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿𝑖 + ∝ 𝑖𝜓𝑖𝑡𝐿(𝑡) ―1𝑡 ―𝜎
where  is the time-invariant part of the country-specific factor loading , L(t) is a slowly 𝛿𝑖𝑡 𝛿𝑖𝑡
varying increasing function (with ,  is the decay rate (i.e. the speed of 𝐿(𝑡)→∞ 𝑎𝑠 𝑡 →∞) 𝜎
convergence), and  is a weakly autocorrelated random error variable (  is iid(0,1)). Based on 𝜓𝑖𝑡 𝜓𝑖𝑡
the time varying factor presentation in equation (1), Phillips and Sul proposed a convergence test 
and clustering algorithm based on the log  convergence test that is based on a simple time series 𝑡
regression involving a one-sided t-test. In the framework, the null hypothesis is as follows:
: Convergence for all   = δ and  vs: : No convergence for all   ≠ δ and 𝐻0 𝑖 𝐻0: 𝛿𝑖 𝜎 ≥ 0 𝐻1 𝑖 𝐻1: 𝛿𝑖 𝜎
                                                                                                                                          (7)< 0
The testing procedure involves the following three steps: 
1. Calculation of the cross-sectional variance ratio     
  (from Equation 5). 𝐻1/𝐻𝑡
2. Estimation of the following OLS regression:
,   (8)    l𝑜𝑔 (𝐻1𝐻𝑡) ―2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 =  [𝑔𝑇],[𝑔𝑇] +1,…, 𝑇    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑔 > 0
3. One-side t test for  using (  and HAC standard error. g (g ∈ (0, 1)) is a truncation 𝜎 ≥ 𝑏 𝑏 = 2𝜎)
parameter that shortens the regression by a certain fraction of the first observations. Monte Carlo 
simulations by Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest the use of g = 0.3 and L(t) = log t for samples up to 
T = 34. Given the assumptions outlined by Phillips and Sul (2007), the standard critical values can 
be applied such that the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at the 5% level if .𝑡𝑏 < ―1.65
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4.2 Club clustering/convergence and Club merging algorithm
The log t test is rejected for samples that do not converge overall. Phillips and Sul (2007) developed 
a club clustering algorithm to detect both convergence clubs and diverging regions, countries or 
sectors. The algorithm consists of the following four steps: Step 1 (Last Observation Ordering): 
We ordered the members of the panel according to the last observation, since evidence of 
convergence will, in general, be most apparent in the recent years. However, in the case of 
substantial time series volatility in , the ordering of the series can be done based on time series 𝑋𝑖𝑡
averages of the final observations. In this study, the first approach was used. Step 2 (Core Group 
Formation): We attempted to identify a core group of countries that provide strong evidence of 
convergence. Specifically, we estimated a sequence of  regression using the  highest 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑡 𝑘
members (Step 1) for all different values of (i.e ).  We chose the regression that 𝑘 2 ≤ 𝐾 < 𝑁
generates the maximum convergence t-statistic  (where  so that convergence was 𝑡𝑏,𝑘 𝑡𝑏,𝑘 > ―1.65
ensured for the corresponding group). The corresponding group formed the core convergence 
group. Step 3 (Club Membership): We then evaluated each individual country not included in the 
core convergence group (Step 2) for membership in this group. In more detail: we added one 
country at a time and calculated the convergence t-statistic from the  regression. The new 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑡
country (member) satisfies the membership condition if the associated t-statistic is greater than a 
chosen critical value  (i.e ). All countries that satisfy the membership condition were 𝑐 ∗ 𝑡𝑏 > 𝑐 ∗
added to the core convergence group. Finally, we checked whether the whole group (i.e. the 
members of the initial core group and the additional selected members) satisfied the criterion for 
convergence. Step 4 (Recursion and Stopping): We ran the  regression for all the countries for log 𝑡
which  in the previous step. If the null hypothesis was not rejected, those countries 𝑡𝑏 < ―1.65
formed a second convergence club. In case it was rejected, we repeated steps 1-3 on the remaining 
countries to determine whether the group itself could be subdivided into convergence clusters. If 
there was no  in step 2 for which , we concluded that the remaining countries displayed 𝑘 𝑡𝑏 > ―1.65
divergent behaviour.
Although the above procedure helps in identifying cluster formations of all possible configurations 
such as the panel convergence and divergence, converging subgroups and single diverging units. 
This study still applied the Phillips and Sul (2009) methodology which helps in merging clubs 
when the procedure outlined above tends to overestimate the number of clubs above their true 
number11.  This is because Phillips and Sul (2007) recommend highly conservative values of the 
critical value c in step 3, in particular c = 0, in order to reduce the risk of including a false member 
into a convergence group. 
4.3 Data 
This study used an annual panel data that covered the period 1985 to 2018 for 125 countries. The 
DS as a share of GDP (DS) was sourced from the SIPRI database and includes all current and 
capital expenditures in the armed forces. The choice of the period and countries was due to the 
11 Interested readers are referred to Phillips and Sul (2009) framework for more details.
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availability of data from the SIPRI database. Countries are grouped based on different income 
levels, regions and subregions in order to obtain different convergence results among different 
groups. First, the 125 countries were classified into four income groups based on the World Bank 
classification of the world's economies into low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income 
countries. We based this disaggregation on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, calculated 
using the World Bank Atlas method12. Secondly, countries are grouped into four regions13. Thirdly, 
we classified the data into other five groups: G7, OECD, NATO, Asia, and Europe14. There were 
a few missing data, and this was taken care of through a projection by linear trend extrapolation 
of matching known data points by the least squares method, and moving the average interpolation 




5 Empirical Results and Discussion
5.1 Descriptive statistics results analysis
The summary statistics on DS as a share of GDP (defence burden) for the low, lower-middle, 
upper-middle, and high-income countries, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin American & the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, G7, NATO and OECD 
are presented in Table 4. In order to obtain the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation; we disaggregated our data into income, regional, economic and defence cooperation 
groupings. On average, the world's low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries, 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Latin American & the Caribbean, the Middle East & North 
Africa, G7, NATO and the OECD have 0.024; 0.019; 0.022; 0.023; 0.029; 0.039; 0.021; 0.019; 
0.020; 0.015; 0.055; 0.023; 0.021 and 0.021 respectively. A similar interpretation holds for the 
other four summary statistics.
<Insert Table 4>
5.2 Convergence results analysis for the world and income groups
Tables 5 to 7 report the results of the panel convergence methodology for DS for the world, the 
income groups and regions. Table 5 presents the world results and those for the four stated income 
groups. Under the world and income groups the first rows report the results of testing for full 
convergence. While other rows show the results of the club clustering procedure/algorithm and the 
final club merging results. We started by examining the world and the four income groups. Under 
the full sample for the world, and all countries' income groups, the null hypothesis of full panel 
12 See Table 1 for details on the classifications. The standard for grouping based on GNI per capita may have changed over some 
years, but very few countries have moved from one group to the other.
13 See Table 2 for details
14 See Table 3 for details. This classification is based on international economic and defence alliance cooperation among some 
countries.  
15 Studies that have used these techniques include David (2019) and Saba & Ngepah (2019b, 2019c) 
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convergence for the defence burden is rejected (since the <-1.65, that is, -20.667<-1.65, -𝑡𝑏
23.644<-1.65, -48.949<-1.65 and -18.356<-1.65 respectively) indicating that they do not converge 
at the same steady state (except the low income countries). According to Phillips and Sul (2007), 
the sign of the point estimate is also a way of evaluating convergence patterns. Since  = = 𝑏 = 2𝜎 𝜎
 = -0.564/2, -0.058/2, -0.604/2, -1.016/2 and -0.381/2 are negative, the speed of adjustment 𝑏/2
implies weak convergence for the world and the three income groups over the full sample period. 
In order to avoid overestimation of the clubs, we ran the club merging algorithm across the sub-
clubs, as recommended by Phillips and Sul (2009). This was to assess whether there was any 
evidence in support of merging the clubs into larger clubs. The test for club merging results in 
Table 5 shows that no club could be merged since the <-1.65 (except for upper-middle income 𝑡𝑏
countries where club 2 and 3 could be merged, since the >-1.65).𝑡𝑏
The club clustering algorithm results for the world (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-
income countries) are presented in Table 5. For club 1 and 2 under the world, the null hypothesis 
of club convergence is accepted (since = 2.058>-1.65 and 5.264>-1.65 respectively). The panel 𝑡𝑏
convergence results of this study were not consistent with the previous findings of Arvanitidis et 
al. (2014), Arvanitidis and Kollias (2016) and Lau et al. (2016). Their findings render support in 
favour of a convergence hypothesis with the use of nonlinear unconditional β-convergence, σ-
convergence and β-convergence methodologies. The differences between the findings of this study 
and the abovementioned studies can be attributed to the use of different methodologies and 
different sample sizes.
For Club 1 under the low-income countries, the null hypothesis of club convergence is accepted 
(since = -0.747> -1.65). For clubs 1, 2 and 3 under the lower-middle-income countries, the null 𝑡𝑏
hypothesis of club convergence is accepted (since = 3.641> -1.65, 6.104> -1.65, 4.706>-1.65) 𝑡𝑏
respectively, while club 4 diverges. Under the upper-middle income countries, the final club 
classification results show that clubs 1, 2 and 3 converge since the >-1.65, that is, -0.084> -1.65, 𝑡𝑏
0.709> -1.65, 16.336>-1.65 respectively. Under the high-income countries, clubs 1, 2 and 3 
converge since the >-1.65, that is, 3.146> -1.65, 11.623> -1.65, 4.867>-1.65 respectively. Figure 𝑡𝑏
2 depicts the panel relative transition curves for the world (low, lower-middle, upper-middle and 
high-income countries) calculated from Equation 2. These curves show the behaviour of the DS 
for low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries relative to the panel average. 
According to theory, under the assumption of convergence for the full panel of countries, the 
relative transition path tends to be in unity for all countries. On the other hand, under the 
assumption of club convergence (i.e. when groups of countries converge to different equilibria), 
the relative transition paths of the members of each club converge to different constants. A visual 
inspection of these curves enabled us to gain some insight into the outcomes of the testing 
methodology and to monitor the DS course for each income group relative to the sample average. 
In summary, a careful visual inspection of the panel transition paths for the four income groups 
showed that these income group countries exhibited divergence/convergence over the study 
period. The convergence club results for the DS suggest that the countries in each income group 
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are at different levels of DS. The full sample for the world does not suggest evidence of 
conditional/relative convergence16  towards the average, as the value of the log t parameter is -
0.564. The countries in the full sample exhibited both transition paths above 1 and those below 1. 
Under the world results, the first and second clubs suggest evidence of conditional or relative 
convergence towards the average, as the values of their log t parameters are 0.048 and 0.147, 
respectively. The relative transition parameter of these clubs tends to value 1, or the sample 
average.
The existence of convergence is evidence that the concept of a security web introduced by Rosh 
(1988) exists in particular regions (Solarin, 2018). But in the case of this study, the absence of 
panel convergence of DS at the world level implies that the concept of a security web does not 
exist. This is indeed true because not all countries in the world see their neighbouring countries as 
threats. Thus, any increase (or decrease) in the defence indicators, including the defence burden of 
neighbouring countries (which is captured by the average of the series), may not necessarily 
influence the DS of such countries. While the presence of club 1 and 2 convergence at the world 
level implies that the security web concept introduced by Rosh (1988) now holds. This is because 
some countries see their neighbouring/allied countries as threats to their national security. 
Therefore, countries trying to catch up with the expenditures of other countries have the tendency 
to reduce free riding (Caruso & Di Domizio, 2016). The lack of panel convergence suggests there 
are idiosyncratic country-specific factors such as forms of government, economic systems, 
conflicts and security conditions, public expenditure compositions, institutional factors, 
socioeconomic conditions, state fragility issues, capabilities and efficiency of defence sectors that 
can explain the differences in the DS. The results at the world level further confirm that most 
countries appear to have chosen dissimilar paths for their defence measures, which may be the 
reason behind the different levels of transition paths for defence spending. According to Barro 
(1990), in theory, the economic impact of DS on the economy may be nonlinear, implying that the 
different levels of income of countries may also determine their convergence/divergence. To 
investigate the important issue of whether one size does in fact fit all regarding DS convergence, 
we classified our panel data into four income groups and six regions. The absence of panel 
convergence for the three income group countries implies that there are idiosyncratic country-
specific factors responsible for the differences in the DS. The absence of panel convergence could 
tentatively be interpreted as suggesting a process of policy divergence in terms of input used and 
different approaches adopted by countries in the production of national defence and security. This 
may also be reflecting divergence in the security challenges that countries face including the threat 
posed by transnational terrorism.
<Insert Table 5>
5.3 Convergence results analysis for the G7, OECD and NATO countries
Table 6 presents the results for the G7, OECD and NATO countries. Under these countries, the first 
rows report the results of testing the panel convergence, while other rows show the results of the 
16 Note that conditional or relative convergence implies tending towards the sample average and a transition parameter equal to 1.
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club clustering procedure/algorithm and the final club merging results. We examined the three 
economic and defence cooperating countries. Under the full sample for the G7, OECD and NATO 
countries, the null hypothesis of full panel convergence for the defence burden was rejected (since 
the <-1.65, that is, -21.185<-1.65, -135.091<-1.65 and -43.024< -1.65, respectively) indicating 𝑡𝑏
that they do not converge at the same steady state. According to Phillips and Sul (2007), the sign 
of the point estimate is also a way of evaluating convergence patterns. Since  = =  = -𝑏 = 2𝜎 𝜎 𝑏/2
0.591/2, -0.546/2 and -0.742/2 are negative, the speed of adjustment implies weak convergence 
for the G7, OECD and NATO countries respectively, over the full sample period. In order to avoid 
overestimation of the clubs, we ran the club merging algorithm across the sub-clubs, as 
recommended by Phillips and Sul (2009), for the purpose of assessing whether any evidence exists 
in support of merging clubs into larger clubs. The test of the club merging results in Table 6 shows 
that no club can be merged since the <-1.65. Therefore, we maintained the initial club results, 𝑡𝑏
implying that the initial clubs were not overestimated.
The club clustering algorithm results for the G7, OECD and NATO countries are presented in 
Table 6. Under G7, club 1 converges while club 2 diverges. For the OECD countries, the null 
hypothesis of club convergence is rejected for club 4, while for clubs 1, 2 and 3, the null hypothesis 
of club convergence is accepted (since = -0.304> -1.65, 0.322> -1.65, 6.745>-1.65) respectively. 𝑡𝑏
Under the NATO countries, the null hypothesis of club convergence is rejected for club 4, while 
for clubs 1, 2 and 3, the null hypothesis of club convergence is accepted (since = -1.497> -1.65, 𝑡𝑏
1.104> -1.65, 1.174>-1.65) respectively. Figures 2E, 2F and 2G depict the panel relative transition 
curves for the G7, OECD and NATO countries, calculated from Equation 2. These curves show 
the behaviour of the DS for G7, OECD and NATO countries relative to the panel average. 
According to theory, under the assumption of convergence for the full panel of countries, the 
relative transition path tends to be in unity for all countries. However, under the assumption of 
club convergence (i.e. when groups of countries converge to different equilibria), the relative 
transition paths of the members of each club converge to different constants. A visual inspection 
of these curves enabled us to gain insight into the outcomes of the testing methodology and monitor 
the defence burden course for each country relative to the sample average. In summary, a careful 
visual inspection of the panel transition paths showed that the countries exhibited divergence over 
the study period. The panel convergence result for NATO is not in line with studies conducted by 
Sawhney et al. (2016), Arvanitidis et al. (2017), and Güriş et al. (2017), which have provided 
substantial evidence of convergence among NATO countries. But it is in line with Clements et al. 
(2019). The differences between the findings of this study and the previous studies can be 
attributed to the use of different methodologies and different sample sizes.
The absence of panel convergence for the G7, OECD and NATO countries confirms the 
differences in their defence spending.  According to the SIPRI (2018) report, G7 countries are 
among the top 18 countries with the largest defence budgets, with the US being the leading country. 
Seven of the 18 highest spenders are members of NATO: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, 
the UK and the USA. Together, these seven countries accounted for 48 per cent ($880 billion) of 
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global DS in 2018. Total spending by all 29 NATO members was $963 billion in 2018. Although 
these three organisations have economic and defence aims and objectives/cooperation, they are 
also often found engaging in the defence race. The military race has caused their DS to increase 
and have spillover effects, which has led to some regions been put at risk of war. As identified in 
the Liu et al. (2019) study, the convergence/divergence of these countries could also result from 
their geographical space layout and international relationship convergence. The NATO members' 
undertaking to spend 2% of their GDP on their defence sectors has proven difficult. This is 
supported by the results of this study. NATO members should stop paying lip service to their 
spending targets and demonstrate commitment to allocating the 2% of their GDP to defence 
spending. The absence of panel convergence for the G7, OECD and NATO countries suggests that 
there could be a number of  factors driving such divergent process which may include lapses in 
copying of best practices as well as independent but different national responses to common 
security challenges and problems emanating from the international system.
<Insert Table 6>
5.4 Convergence results analysis for the regions
Table 7 presents the results for six regions. Under these regions, the first rows report the results of 
testing full convergence, while other rows show the results of the club clustering 
procedure/algorithm and the final club merging results. We continued by examining the regions. 
Under the full sample for Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East & North Africa, Asia, Latin 
America & the Caribbean, Europe & Central Asia, and Europe, the null hypothesis of full panel 
convergence for the DS was rejected (since the <-1.65, that is, -20.895<-1.65, -4.349<-1.65, -𝑡𝑏
16.453<-1.65, -15.198<-1.65, -41.464<-1.65, -34.293<-1.65 respectively), indicating that they do 
not converge at the same steady state. Given that  = =  = -0.419/2, -0.321/2, -0.444/2, 𝑏 = 2𝜎 𝜎 𝑏/2
-0.421/2, -0.863/2, -0.919/2  are negative, the speed of adjustment implies weak convergence for 
the six regions over the full sample period. We ran the club merging algorithm across the sub-
clubs in order to avoid overestimation of the clubs. The test of club merging results in Table 7 
shows that no club can be merged since the <-1.65, except for Latin America & the Caribbean 𝑡𝑏
(club 1+2 and 2+3) and  Europe & Central Asia (club 2+3), which can be merged since the >-𝑡𝑏
1.65).  
The club clustering algorithm results for the six regions are presented in Table 7. For club 1and 2 
under the six regions, the null hypothesis of club convergence was accepted (since the values >-𝑡𝑏
1.65). The same rule held for club 3 under Asia and Europe. For club 3 under the Latin America 
& the Caribbean and Europe & Central Asia, the null hypothesis of club convergence was rejected 
(since the values of <-1.65), which imply divergence. For club 4 under Europe, the null 𝑡𝑏
hypothesis of club convergence was also rejected (since the values of <-1.65). Figure 2 depicts 𝑡𝑏
the panel relative transition paths for the six regions calculated from Equation 2. These curves 
show the behaviour of the DS for the six regions relative to the panel average. A visual inspection 
of these curves enabled us to gain some insight into the outcomes of the testing methodology and 
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to monitor the DS course for each region relative to the sample average. In summary, a careful 
visual inspection of the panel curves for the six regions show that countries in the regions exhibited 
divergence patterns over the study period. 
Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is faced with diverse security threats such as urban riots, border threats, 
banditry, civil war/strife, insurgency, transnational threats, terrorism17, etc. For example, Alfa-
Wali et al. (2015) note that the rate at which terrorism is gaining ground in the region represents a 
serious growing policy concern. For example, Nigeria, Sub-Saharan Africa’s second-largest 
spender behind South Africa, increased its DS by 18 per cent to $2.0 billion in 2018 for the first 
time in six years, due to insecurity in the country (SIPRI report, 2018). The diverse security 
challenges could have contributed to the lack of panel convergence for the full sample. The 
evidence of club convergence of the first club could be linked to the fact that these countries belong 
to different African regional economic communities that promote defence and security 
cooperation. For example, SADC member states have contributed to peace, political stability and 
security conditions in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The Middle East and North African (MENA) countries are economically diverse and yet are 
characterized by a common heritage. Over past years, some countries in the region have 
experienced, and are still experiencing, military or civil conflicts. This has resulted in political 
instability, poverty and inequality, and economic displacement. Thus, a significant share of 
national budgets is utilised for DS because countries in the region also engage in the arms race, 
terrorism and insurgency, and are the largest arms importer region in the world (SIPRI, 2017). 
According to SIPRI data, the Middle East is the most militarised region in the world. One of the 
issues that shapes military spending/balance in the Middle East is the Israeli-Arab conflict 
(Yildirim, Sezgin and Öcal, 2005). This could have contributed to the lack of panel convergence 
for the full study sample. The presence of club convergence points to the fact that there is still hope 
for the region despite the security challenges it faces, because some countries are seen to be 
converging. 
The panel nonconvergence in the Asian region could be linked to several among other events that 
occurred such as: (i) the Asian financial crisis which reduced their ability to allocate funds to 
defence spending; (ii) interstate conflict between India and Pakistan in addition to internal conflicts 
in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Sri Lanka (SIPRI, 2000); (iii) the arms race18; (iv) 
there is no strong and strategic defence alliance that sets DS targets for countries, compared to the 
NATO countries. The Asian region consists of great power rivalries, irredentist conflicts, nuclear 
and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements, ethnoreligious conflicts and interstate 
17 Notable recent examples of terrorism include: (i) the 2013 Westgate shopping mall and 2015 Garissa University attacks by the 
Somali Al-Shabaab in Kenya; (ii) Boko Haram of Nigeria extending its sphere of terrorism to neighbouring countries like Chad, 
Cameroon and Niger (Efobi & Asongu, 2016).
18 According to Tan (2013), the Asian arms race is divided into three main parts, which include: external factors (such as great 
power rivalries,  interstate tensions, territorial disputes, increased importance of maritime security, post-Cold War buyers’ market, 
and defence diplomacy); internal factors (such as economic growth, internal security, national prestige, domestic politics, and 
corruption), and the technological imperative which explains Asia’s increasing levels of DS as well as the acquisition of ever more 
sophisticated weapons systems.
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wars. According to SIPRI report in 2018, five of the top 15 global defence spenders are in Asia 
region. For example, between 2009 and 2018, China, Turkey, India, Russia and Japan increased 
their DS. Although, the increase in their DS differs. According to SIPRI, the 4.8 per cent rise in 
the region’s DS in 2019 continued an uninterrupted upward trend dating back to at least 1989. Asia 
is the only region with continuous growth since 1989 and the growth of 51 per cent over the decade 
2010-19 was by far the largest of any region (SIPRI, 2019). The increase was due primarily to the 
rise in Chinese DS, which in 2019 accounted for 50 per cent of total spending in the region, up 
from 36 per cent in 2010 (SIPRI, 2019). Increases in Indian DS are largely motivated by tensions 
and rivalry with Pakistan and China (SIPRI, 2018). The differences in the DS without a clear 
common set target in spending and the challenges facing the region could have contributed to the 
nonconvergence of the full sample. 
For the Latin American countries, between 1961 and 2014, most of the countries in this region 
experienced military involvement in their domestic politics, and this has left an ineradicable mark 
in Latin American history. For example, the study by Kollias, Paleologou, Tzeremes and Tzeremes 
(2017) found that DS expressed as a share of GDP was higher during military rule compared to 
the regions average for the entire period of the study. A study by Scheetz (2002) found a decline 
in DS as a share of GDP since the beginning of the democratic upheavals/transitions. This implies 
that the forms of government that operated in the region must have contributed to either high or 
low DS. Thus, its possible consequence on the convergence results.
According to the SIPRI (2018) report, the total DS in Europe increased by 1.4 per cent to 
$364 billion in 2018. Europe accounted for 20 per cent of global defence spending, which makes 
it the third-largest spending region behind the Americas, Asia and Oceania. One of the reasons 
behind the increased spending is the growing perceived threat from the Russian Federation. In 
recent years, we have seen the emergence of new security challenges in Europe, including 
terrorism and civil war crises. The emergence of such security challenges has resulted in pressure 
for changes in defence structures/equipment as well as increased military expenditure in a number 
of countries, particularly the UK, Germany, and France. Among other factors, these could have 
contributed to the nonconvergence of the full sample. Nonconvergence of the panel sample shows 
that the quest for a common European defence and security policy is yet to be fully achieved. 
These results call for a renewed commitment to achieving a common European defence and 
security policy throughout Europe. 
<Insert Table 7>
<Insert Figure 2>
To conclude this section, the results have the following implications: (i) the absence of panel 
convergence in the three income groups, six regions, and the economic and defence cooperating 
countries implies that the countries in these samples that initially allocated a smaller share of their 
national income to the defence sector may not easily catch up with the countries that initially 
allocated a bigger share of their national income to the defence sector in terms of the amounts 
involved in allocating scarce productive public resources; (ii) for countries where the club 
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clustering algorithm results show the presence of club convergence in DS, it implies that there are 
countries within the sub-groups that initially allocated a smaller share of their national income to 
the defence sector and may have a tendency to catch up with countries within the sub-groups that 
initially allocated a bigger share of their national income to the defence sector, in terms of the size 
of allocating scarce productive public resources, and vice versa; (iii) the presence of club 
convergence means that idiosyncratic country-specific factors may not explain the differences in 
DS across countries within the same club, and vice versa.
6 Conclusion 
There is a growing body of literature focusing on the convergence in defence spending (DS) among 
researchers, and this study further contribute to the existing literature by re-examining the 
convergence in international DS by means of the methodology introduced by Phillips and Sul 
(2007, 2009). We used 125 countries for the period 1985-2018. The application of this 
methodological approach causes this study to differ from those conducted by Arvanitidis et al. 
(2014), Arvanitidis and Kollias (2016) and Lau et al. (2016). This study's methodology used a non-
linear factor model with a common and idiosyncratic component, both time varying, which 
allowed for technical progress and heterogeneity across provinces, regions, states. From an 
empirical point of view, the main advantage of this methodology    in addition to its robustness 
and the stationarity properties of the series under scrutiny    is the provision of a simple algorithm 
that can be used to identify groups of countries that converge to different equilibria when the full 
panel of countries under examination diverges. 
According to Barro (1990), in theory, the economic impact of DS on the economy may be non-
linear, implying that the different levels of countries' incomes may also determine their 
convergence/divergence.  To investigate the important issue of whether one size does in fact fit all 
regarding DS convergence, we classified our panel data into four income groups and six regions. 
We further divided our panel data into three sub-samples (OECD, G7 and NATO) to compare their 
convergence results with incomes and regional groups. We therefore tested the hypothesis that DS 
as a share of GDP at the global, income group, and regional levels either converge or diverge over 
time. The empirical results from this study suggest an absence of panel convergence at the 
international, income group (except the low-income countries) and regional levels. This implies 
that the process of convergence in DS does not reflect the desired emanations of defence policies 
sharing similar characteristics, at least in terms of the allocation of resources at the international, 
income group and regional levels. The key findings from the club convergence algorithm results 
for DS are as follows: (i) at world level, club 1 and 2 converge; (ii) the remaining groups form 1, 
2, 3 and 4 clubs, with different outcomes (i.e. convergence/divergence). The full sample for the 
world, all the regions, income groups, G7, OECD and NATO suggest no evidence of 
conditional/relative convergence (which implies no tendencies towards the sample average and a 
transition parameter not equal to 1) towards the average, as the value of the log t parameter  was 
negative and less than 1. The countries in the full sample exhibited both transition paths above 1 
and those below 1. 
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The nonconvergence of the full sample and the presence of the different subgroup 
convergence/divergence clubs for DS imply that world governments/regions are characterised by 
individual factors that determine an idiosyncratic course of their own path for defence policies. 
The empirics suggest that world governments/regions appear to have chosen dissimilar paths for 
their defence spending/policy measures, especially in terms of the resources allocated to defence 
sector spending. Thus, the absence of panel convergence across the samples. The club convergence 
results cannot be generalised as there are both convergent and divergent clubs. The empirics further 
confirm that countries appear to have chosen dissimilar paths for their defence measures, which 
could be the reason behind the different levels of transition paths for defence spending. Since 
factors affecting DS across the world differ, policymakers should: (i) consider the different features 
of the divergent/convergent countries; (ii) identify and prioritise idiosyncratic country-specific 
factors such as forms of government, economic systems, conflicts and security conditions, 
institutional factors, state fragility issues, and the capabilities and efficiency of the defence sector, 
that could explain the differences in the DS by quickly, honestly and sincerely addressing them. 
Clearly, the results reported in this study should be treated as further findings on the international 
convergence in defence spending. Further research could apply the ESTAR nonlinear unit root test 
by taking into account country-specific or region-specific characteristics, such as defence alliances 
and rivalries, and political and economic development/cooperation factors, just as this study has 
done. Furthermore, compared to this present study and previous studies, future research should use 
a dataset that is wider in scope in terms of time and number of countries. 
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Figure 1: Average defence spending as a percentage share of GDP between 1985 and 2018
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Panel Transition Paths for Defence spending as share of GDP for the World level, Income and Regional Groups 
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Figure 2: (A) Defence spending (DS) panel transition paths for low income countries; (B) DS panel transition paths  for lower middle-income countries; (C) DS panel 
transition paths  for upper middle-income countries; (D) DS panel transition paths  for high income countries; (E) DS panel transition paths  for G7 countries; (F) DS panel 
transition paths  for OECD countries; (G) DS panel transition paths for NATO; (H) DS panel transition paths  for Sub-Saharan Africa; (I) DS panel transition paths for Middle 
East and North Africa; (J) DS panel transition paths  for Asia; (K) DS panel transition paths  for Latin America & Caribbean; (L) DS panel transition paths for Europe & 
Central Asia; (M) DS panel transition paths  for Europe; (N) DS panel transition paths for the world 
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Table 1: List of countries used in the estimations ranked by World Bank GNI per capita






Benin Angola Albania Australia
Burkina Faso Bangladesh Algeria Austria
Burundi Bolivia Argentina Bahrain
Chad Cambodia Belize Belgium
Congo, Dem. Rep. Cameroon Botswana Brunei
Ethiopia Cape Verde Brazil Canada
Gambia Congo, Republic of China Chile
Guinea Côte d’Ivoire Colombia Cyprus
Guinea-Bissau Egypt Dominican Rep. Denmark
Liberia El Salvador Ecuador Finland
Madagascar eSwatini Fiji France
Malawi Ghana Gabon Germany
Mali Honduras Guatemala Greece
Mozambique India Guyana Hungary
Nepal Indonesia Iran Ireland
Niger Kenya Iraq Israel
Rwanda Lesotho Jamaica Italy
Sierra Leone Mauritania Jordan Japan
Tanzania Mongolia Lebanon Kuwait
Togo Morocco Libya Luxembourg
Uganda Myanmar Malaysia Malta
Nicaragua Mauritius Netherlands
Nigeria Mexico New Zealand
Pakistan Namibia Norway
Papua New Guinea Paraguay Oman
Philippines Peru Poland
Senegal Romania Portugal
Sudan Russia Saudi Arabia
Tunisia South Africa Seychelles
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Table 2: List of countries classified into four different regional groups.
Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East and North 
Africa
Latin American & 
Caribbean
Europe and Central Asia
Angola Algeria Argentina Albania
Benin Bahrain Belize Austria
Botswana Egypt Bolivia Belgium
Burkina Faso Iran Brazil Cyprus
Burundi Iraq Chile Denmark
Cameroon Israel Colombia Finland
Cape Verde Jordan Dominican Rep. France
Chad Kuwait Ecuador Germany
Congo, Dem. Rep. Lebanon El Salvador Greece
Congo, Repubic of Libya Guatemala Hungary
Côte d’Ivoire Morocco Honduras Ireland
eSwatini Oman Jamaica Italy
Ethiopia Saudi Arabia Mexico Luxembourg
Gabon Tunisia Nicaragua Netherlands
Gambia Turkey Paraguay Norway
Ghana Peru Poland
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Table 3: List of countries classified into the other five groups.
                 OECD                G7          NATO           Asia           Europe
Australia Canada Albania Bahrain Albania
Austria France Belgium Bangladesh Austria
Belgium Germany Canada Cambodia Belgium
Canada Italy Denmark China Cyprus
Chile Japan France Cyprus Denmark
Denmark UK Germany India Finland
Finland USA Greece Indonesia France
France Canada Hungary Iran Germany
Germany France Italy Iraq Greece
Greece Germany Luxembourg Israel Hungary
Hungary Italy Netherlands Japan Ireland
Ireland Japan Norway Jordan Italy
Israel UK Poland Kuwait Luxembourg
Italy USA Portugal Lebanon Malta
Japan Romania Malaysia Netherlands
Korea, South Spain Mongolia Norway
Luxembourg Turkey Myanmar Poland
Mexico UK Nepal Portugal
Netherlands USA Oman Romania
New Zealand Pakistan Russia
Norway Philippines Spain
Poland Russia Sweden







Note: Readers should note that G7, NATO and OECD are classified based on the economic, defence and 
security cooperation that exists among them.
Table 4: Summary Statistics Results for Defence Spending as a percentage share of GDP
Statistics
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
World   0.024 0.018 1.173 0.000 0.029
Low Income Countries  0.019  0.014  0.297 0.000 0.019
Lower-Middle-Income Countries   0.022 0.018  0.223 0.000 0.019
Upper-Middle-Income Countries  0.023  0.019 0.155 0.001 0.017
Higher-Income Countries  0.029 0.019 1.173 0.002 0.045
Asia  0.039 0.028 1.173 0.006 0.049
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.021 0.016 0.297 0.000 0.020
Europe  0.019 0.016 0.091 0.003  0.011
Europe and Central Asia  0.020 0.017 0.091 0.003 0.011
Latin American & Caribbean  0.015 0.013 0.069 0.002 0.010
Middle East and North Africa  0.055  0.041 1.173 0.009 0.064
G7  0.023 0.019  0.063 0.009 0.011
NATO  0.021  0.019 0.063  0.004  0.011
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OECD  0.021 0.018 0.176 0.003 0.018
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure database. Std. Dev. is standard deviation. 
Note: Defence Spending as a percentage share of GDP is in logarithm form. 
Table 5: Defence spending and final club convergence results (club merging) for the World and 
Income Groups.
Sample                                   Countries 𝒃 𝑪𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇    SE 𝒕 ― 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕
World
Full sample -0.564* 0.0273  -20.667
First Club Algeria | Angola | Australia | Bahrain | Bangladesh | Belize 
| Benin | Bolivia | Botswana | Brazil | Brunei | Burkina Faso 
| Burundi | Cambodia | Cameroon | Chad | Chile | China | 
Colombia | Congo, Republic of | Côte d’Ivoire | Ecuador | 
Egypt |eSwatini | Finland| France | Gabon | Gambia | 
Greece | Guinea | Guinea-Bissau | Guyana | Honduras | 
India | Iran | Iraq | Israel |Italy | Jamaica | Jordan | Kenya | 
Korea, South | Kuwait | Lebanon | Lesotho | Libya | Mali | 
Mauritania | Morocco | Myanmar | Namibia | Nepal | Niger 
| Norway | Oman | Pakistan | Poland | Portugal | Russia | 
Saudi Arabia | Senegal | Singapore | Sri Lanka | Sudan | 
Taiwan | Thailand | Togo | Trinidad & Tobago | Tunisia | 
Turkey |UK | Uruguay | USA | Viet Nam | Zambia | 
Zimbabwe |
0.048 0.023    2.058
Second Club | Albania | Argentina | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Cape 
Verde| Congo, Dem. Rep. | Cyprus | Denmark | Dominican 
Rep. | El Salvador | Ethiopia | Fiji | Germany | Ghana | 
Guatemala | Hungary | Indonesia | Ireland | Japan | Liberia 
| Luxembourg | Madagascar | Malawi | Malaysia | Malta | 
Mauritius |Mexico | Mongolia | Mozambique | Netherlands 
| New Zealand | Nicaragua | Nigeria | Papua New Guinea | 
Paraguay | Peru | Philippines | Romania | Rwanda | 
Seychelles | Sierra Leone | South Africa | Spain | Sweden | 
Switzerland | Tanzania | Uganda | Venezuela |
0.147 0.028 5.264
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.565** 0.027 -20.667
Low-Income Countries
Full sample -0.058 0.078 -0.747
First Club | Benin | Burkina Faso | Burundi | Chad | Congo, Dem. 
Rep. Ethiopia | Gambia | Guinea | Guinea-Bissau | Liberia 
|Madagascar | Malawi | Mali | Mozambique | Nepal | Niger 
| Rwanda | Sierra Leone | Tanzania | Togo | Uganda 
-0.058 0.078 -0.747
Lower-Middle-Income Countries
Full sample -0.604* 0.026 -23.644
First Club | Angola | Congo, Republic of | Côte d’Ivoire | eSwatini 
|Honduras | India | Mauritania | Morocco | Myanmar | 
Pakistan | Senegal | Sudan | Tunisia | Viet Nam 
0.608 0.167 3.641
Second Club | Bangladesh | Bolivia | Cambodia | Cameroon | Egypt | El 
Salvador | Ghana | Indonesia | Kenya | Lesotho | Mongolia 
| Philippines | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
0.211 0.035 6.104
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Third Club | Cape Verde | Nicaragua | Nigeria | 0.736 0.156 4.706
Fourth Club | Papua New Guinea | Not 
convergent
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.253** 0.039 -6.495
Club 2+3 -0.156** 0.025 -6.157
Club 3+4 -0.569** 0.155 -3.675
Upper-Middle-Income Countries
Full sample -1.016* 0.021 -48.949
First Club | Algeria | Colombia | Ecuador | Iraq | Jordan | Lebanon | 
Libya | Namibia | Russia |
-0.012 0.147 -0.084
Second Club | Albania | Belize | Botswana | Brazil | China | Gabon | 
Guyana | Iran | Jamaica | Malaysia | Mexico | Peru | 
Romania | Sri Lanka |
0.402 0.090 4.446
Third Club | Argentina | Dominican Rep. | Fiji | Paraguay | South 
Africa| Venezuela 
0.727 0.083 8.795
Fourth Club | Guatemala | Mauritius | 0.665 0.041 16.336
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.741** 0.046 -16.203
Club 2+3 0.037 0.052 0.709
Club 3+4 -0.304** 0.035 -8.716
Final club classifications
First Club | Algeria | Colombia | Ecuador | Iraq | Jordan | Lebanon | 
Libya | Namibia | Russia |
-0.012 0.147 -0.084
Second Club | Albania | Argentina | Belize | Botswana | Brazil | China |
 | Dominican Rep. | Fiji | Gabon | Guyana | Iran | Jamaica |
 | Malaysia | Mexico | Paraguay | Peru | Romania | South 
Africa | Sri Lanka | Venezuela |
0.037 0.052 0.709
Third Club | Guatemala | Mauritius | 0.665 0.041 16.336
Higher-Income Countries
Full sample -0.381* 0.021 -18.356
First Club | Oman | Saudi Arabia | 5.749 1.827 3.146
Second Club | Australia | Austria | Bahrain | Belgium | Brunei | Canada 
| Chile |Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | 
Hungary | Israel |Italy | Japan | Kuwait | Netherlands | New 
Zealand | Norway | Poland | Portugal | Seychelles | 
Singapore | Spain | Trinidad & Tobago | UK | Uruguay | 
USA |
0.151 0.013 11.623
Third Club |Cyprus | Ireland | Luxembourg | Malta | Sweden | 
Switzerland |
0.148 0.031 4.867
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.180** 0.020 -8.977
Club 2+3 -0.191** 0.020 -9.340
Note: * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at 5%, while ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of club 
convergence merging at the 5%. SE represent the standard error.
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Table 6: Defence spending and final club convergence results (club merging) for G7, OECD and 
NATO countries.
Sample                                   Countries 𝒃 𝑪𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇    SE 𝒕 ― 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕
G7
Full sample -0.591* 0.028 -21.185
First Club | Canada | Germany | Italy | Japan | UK | 0.178 0.052 3.457
Second Club | France | USA | -1.952* 0.137 -14.260
OECD
Full sample -0.546* 0.004 -135.091
First Club | Australia | Chile | Finland | France | Greece | Israel | Japan 
| Korea, South | Mexico | Poland | Portugal | UK | USA |
-0.008 0.025 -0.304
Second Club | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Denmark | Germany | 
Hungary | Italy |Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | 
Spain | Sweden | Turkey |
0.014 0.043  0.322
Third Club | Luxembourg | Switzerland | 0.509 0.076 6.745
Fourth | Ireland | Not 
convergent
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.262** 0.012 -22.523
Club 2+3 -0.366** 0.020 -18.634
Club 3+4 -0.626** 0.112 -5.573
NATO
Full sample -0.742* 0.017 -43.024
First Club | Albania | Canada | France | Germany | Greece | Italy | 
Norway | Poland | Portugal | Romania | Turkey | UK |
-0.094 0.063 -1.497
Second Club | Denmark | Netherlands | Spain | 0.195 0.177 1.104
Third Club | Belgium | Hungary | 0.409 0.349 1.174
Fourth | Luxembourg | USA | -1.085* 0.038 -28.975
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.241** 0.040 -5.971
Club 2+3 -1.913** 0.030 -63.167
Club 3+4 -1.065** 0.034 -31.291
Note: * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at 5%, while ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of club 
convergence merging at the 5%. SE represent the standard error.
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Table 7: Defence spending and final club convergence results (club merging) for the Regions 
Sample                                   Countries 𝒃 𝑪𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇    SE 𝒕 ― 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕
Sub-Saharan Africa
Full sample -0.419* 0.020 -20.895
First Club | Angola | Benin | Botswana | Burkina Faso | Burundi | 
Cameroon | Chad | Congo, Dem. Rep. | Congo, Repubic of 
| Côte d’Ivoire | eSwatini | Gabon | Gambia | Guinea | 
Guinea-Bissau | Kenya | Lesotho | Malawi | Mali | 
Mauritania | Mozambique | Namibia | Niger | Rwanda | 
Senegal | Seychelles | Sierra Leone | South Africa | Sudan 
| Tanzania | Togo | Uganda | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
-0.068 0.050 -1.367
Second Club | Cape Verde | Ethiopia | Ghana | Liberia | Madagascar | 
Mauritius | Nigeria |
1.537 0.125 12.316
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.419** 0.020 -20.895
Middle East & North Africa
Full sample -0.321* 0.074 -4.349
First Club | Algeria | Bahrain | Iraq | Israel | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon 
|Libya | Morocco | Oman | Saudi Arabia |
0.416 0.061 6.821
Second Club  | Egypt | Iran | Tunisia | Turkey | 0.110 0.111 0.995
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.321** 0.074 -4.349
Asia
Full sample -0.444* 0.027 -16.453
First Club | Iraq | Myanmar | Oman | Saudi Arabia | 0.034 0.049 0.682
Second Club | Bahrain | Bangladesh | Cambodia | China | India | Iran | 
Israel | Japan | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | Nepal | Pakistan 
| Russia | Singapore | Sri Lanka | Taiwan | Thailand | 
Turkey | Viet Nam |
0.170  0.012 13.877
Third Club | Cyprus | Indonesia | Malaysia | Mongolia | Philippines | 0.671 0.085 7.857
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.172** 0.031 -5.601
Club 2+3 -0.197** 0.025 -7.804
Latin America & Caribbean
Full sample -0.421* 0.028 -15.198
First Club | Colombia | Ecuador | Honduras | Trinidad & Tobago | 0.124 0.083 1.494
Second Club | Belize | Chile | El Salvador | Jamaica | Mexico | Uruguay 0.381 0.067 5.647
Third Club | Brazil | Dominican Rep. | Peru | 0.025 0.042 0.608
Fourth Club | Argentina | Paraguay | Venezuela | 0.558 0.808 0.691
Fifth Club | Bolivia | Guatemala | Nicaragua | -1.365* 0.077 -17.793
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 0.038 0.063 0.608
Club 2+3 0.341 0.061 5.595
Club 3+4 -0.197** 0.036 -5.521
Club 4+5 -1.243** 0.087 -14.219
Final Club classifications
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First Club | Belize | Brazil | Chile | Colombia | Dominican Rep. | 
Ecuador |El Salvador | Honduras | Jamaica | Mexico | Peru 
|Trinidad & Tobago | Uruguay |
0.026 0.060 0.427
Second Club | Argentina | Paraguay | Venezuela | 0.558 0.808 0.691
Third Club | Bolivia | Guatemala | Nicaragua | -1.365* 0.077 -17.793
Europe & Central Asia
Full sample -0.863* 0.021 -41.464
First Club | Albania | Cyprus | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany 
| Greece |Italy | Netherlands | Norway | Poland | Portugal | 
Romania | Spain | Turkey | UK |
0.109 0.026 4.250
Second Club | Austria | Belgium | Hungary | Sweden | 0.974 0.075 12.985
Third Club | Luxembourg | Switzerland | 0.509  0.076 6.745
Fourth Club | Ireland | Russia | -1.668* 0.031 -53.936
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.269** 0.027 -9.901
Club 2+3 0.002 0.044 0.035
Club 3+4 -1.404** 0.032 -43.676
Final Club classifications
First Club | Albania | Cyprus | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany 
|Greece | Italy | Netherlands | Norway | Poland | Portugal |
 | Romania | Spain | Turkey | UK |
0.109 0.026 4.250
Second Club | Austria | Belgium | Hungary | Luxembourg | Sweden | 
Switzerland |
0.002 0.044 0.035
Third Club | Ireland | Russia | -1.668* 0.031 -53.936
Europe
Full sample -0.919* 0.027 -34.293
First Club | Cyprus | Finland | France | Greece | Poland | Portugal | 
UK |
0.711 0.047 15.086
Second Club | Albania | Austria | Belgium | Denmark | Germany | 
Hungary | Italy | Netherlands | Norway | Romania | Spain | 
Sweden |
-0.010 0.064 -0.157
Third Club | Luxembourg | Malta | Switzerland | 0.511 0.026 19.603
Fourth Club | Ireland | Russia | -1.668* 0.031 -53.936
Test of Club merging
Club 1+2 -0.411** 0.026  -15.7136
Club 2+3 -0.427** 0.021 -19.972
Club 3+4 -1.344** 0.030 -45.400
Note: * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at 5%, while ** indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of club 
convergence merging at the 5%. SE represent the standard error.
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